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cheaper or higher-quality inputs and from reallocation of resources towards 
higher value-added activities. The international outsourcing case adds another 
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I test the above hypothesis using a “System GMM” estimator to control for 
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upon closer inspection it seems that firms’ international orientation and type of 
industry both matter. 
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In this paper I study the eects of outsourcing on productivity at the rm
level. In order to contextualise this, the factors driving outsourcing's preva-
lence in the modern global economy and the perceptions and realities sur-
rounding its extent and its eect on labour markets will be summarised. I will
then present some theoretical reasons which explain the causality from out-
sourcing to productivity, and show through the estimation of Cobb-Douglas
Production Functions that outsourcing does indeed in
uence rm-level pro-
ductivity, but that this eect is small, and that it is not homogenous when
we break rms down by their international orientation and their industry
characteristics.
As Grossman and Helpman (2005) put it, \we live in an age of outsourcing".
The extent of the proliferation of outsourcing is disucussed in Section 3.1.
The reasons for the onset of this \age of outsourcing" lie in what Baldwin
(2006) refers to as globalisation's \second unbundling". He denes the rst
unbundling as being marked by industrialisation, trade, growth, urbanisa-
tion and increasing internal inequality in the North. Movements in this rst
unbundling can be thought of as sitting within the Hekscher-Ohlin frame-
work where the fortunes of sectors were aligned with the productive factors
used most intensively in the sector. The rm was considered a \black box",
and rm-to-rm competition was the lowest level of aggregation to be anal-
ysed. In Baldwin's "second unbundling", which began in the 1980s, that
\black box" was opened up, as rms started to locate dierent parts of the
production process in dierent locations. The lowest level of disaggregation
was no longer the rm but the task. A German automobile rm can have
a generic input manufactured in and shipped from Shenzen at a much lower
cost than it could have done in Stuttgart. Similarly an employee in Dublin
working for an Irish service rm now faces competition from a worker in In-
dia who can perform the task at a lower cost. There are numerous reasons
for this second unbundling, which are not the focus of this paper. However
I feel it constructive to brie
y mention a few. The fall in taris and trade
costs brought about by greater global integration, deregulation and market
liberalisation is certainly a factor, as is the fall in transport costs due to
improved facilities and technology, and competition in that sector. These
factors more likely played a strong role in the proliferation of the movement
of intermediate input production to foreign countries. The newest wave of
the second unbundling has seen a more rapid growth in the relocation of
service jobs overseas. This relocation owes less to transport and trade costs,
and more to the IT and Communications revolution of the 1990s, and the
huge strides made in developing countries' education systems, meaning that
2more and more workers in these countries are now in direct competition
with workers in developed countries for a wider range of tasks. The rise in
both international material and services outsourcing can also be explained
by the increased competition levels implicit in the globalisation of markets.
As competition has increased, rms have had to come up with more radical
solutions to stay protable. One of these solutions has been to move certain
\non-core" tasks outside the boundary of the rm and in many cases overseas.
An important clarication must be made straight away, as the termi-
nology has often been confused in the literature and media1. Outsourc-
ing is dened as the sourcing of inputs from outside the rm, regardless of
whether these inputs are sourced abroad or domestically. International or
oshore outsourcing, on the contrary, is the sourcing of inputs from outside
the boundaries of the rm and beyond home country borders. This should
not be confused with oshoring, which is the relocation of a part of the pro-
duction process to another country, which can occur within the boundaries
of the rm through Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) or outside those bound-
aries (oshore outsourcing).
While this paper deals with the subject of outsourcing's links to produc-
tivity, it must be acknowledged that international outsourcing's eects on
developed country labour markets have been the focus of a large amount
of (mainly negative) media and popular attention . Famous BusinessWeek
headlines have included \The new global job shift" (Feb 3 2003), with that
issue's front cover asking \Is your job next?". If we, as Baldwin (2006) rec-
ommends, think of oshore outsourcing as simply another form of trade, then
we should think of its labour market eects in the same vain. What this im-
plies is that there are both winners and losers from trade in tasks. Studies
such as Falk and Wolfmayer (2008), Jensen and Kletzer (2006) and Ahn et al
(2008) all indicate that international outsourcing, particularly to low-wage
countries, has a signicant negative eect on home country employment. The
latter paper, for Japan, also nds that outsourcing has a positive eect on
high-skilled labour demand, which indicates that the reallocation of labour
into higher-value activities due to outsourcing is a reality in Japan.
A brief mention to the gap between the fear and the reality surrounding
international outsourcing is also instructive. A consultancy report by For-
rester (2002) predicted that 3.3 million US jobs would be lost to services
1For further distinguishing denitions of the fragmentation of the production process,
see Olsen (2006), Section 2
3oshoring by 2015. This was revised to 3.4 million by McCarthy (2004).
To put this gure into context, many commentators, including Kierkegaard
(2003) and Rohde (2004) refer to a quarterly job destruction rate (often re-
ferred to as \job churn")in the US of between 7-8 million jobs. Furthermore,
Slaughter (2004) reports that 5.4 million jobs in the US for 2002 were at-
tributable to outsourcing to US companies by overseas rms. This gure is
larger than any estimates of jobs lost to oshoring, implying that the US
is in fact a net beneciary from the oshoring phenomenon. Kierkegaard
(2003) also nds that the vast majority of jobs lost to oshoring in the US
from 2000-2002 were those which would likely have been lost to technological
change in the absence of oshoring. Further, Amiti and Wei (2004) nd that
services outsourcing leads to a positive signicant eect on employment at
the industry level.
In analysing outsourcing from the rm side, most attention has been
given to the decision on whether to outsource or keep activity in-house, with
most of this literature being theoretical. Two of the most popular strands
are the property rights approach, as in Antras and Helpman (2004), and the
transaction cost approach, as in McLaren (2000) and Grossman and Help-
man (2003). While not the focus of this paper, this literature is relevant in
that it often nds that productivity plays a part in the outsourcing decision,
bringing endogeneity into play when looking at the eect of outsourcing on
productivity. This will be discussed in depth in Section 5
Rather than look at the decision to outsource, I enquire as to whether
outsourcing is actually of benet to rms. Rohde (2004) references two re-
ports which point to the dangers inherent in engaging in international service
outsourcing: a 2003 Gartner report which estimated $6bn was wasted annu-
ally on failed outsourcing contracts, and a Clearview consulting report which
calculated a \
op rate" of 40-50% for outsourcing contracts.
A sparsely populated existing academic literature has generally found ev-
idence for the positive eect of outsourcing on productivity. There are a
number of papers that look at the link between outsourcing and productiv-
ity at the industry level, such as Feenstra and Hanson (1996). One recent
example is Amiti and Wei (2006), which focuses solely on the international
outsourcing of services. They combine input-output tables with trade data
to get estimates for the level of international outsourcing for 450 manufac-
turing industries. In regressions explaining labour productivity, they nd a
positive and signicant coecient on international service outsourcing, twice
the magnitude of that on international material outsourcing. This method of
4analysis lacks an important level of detail in that it does not model rm-level
eects. Olsen (2006) gives a good overview of the literature, including studies
at industry level as well as rm level. After synopsising the avenues through
which outsourcing can increase rm productivity, I will brie
y mention some
of the rm-level studies carried out to date.
The reasons to expect a causal relationship from outsourcing (both in
general and oshore) to rm-level productivity are outlined in Section 2. For
now it is sucient to brie
y mention these reasons, and my empirical strategy.
At the most basic level, outsourcing can be thought of as the replacement of
a rm's employees and processes with an outside provider. In what follows I
talk of outsourcing in general, as the procurement of an input or service from
outside the boundaries of the rms, and not of international outsourcing in
particular. When a process or input is outsourced, and in-house workers are
replaced, the rm should see an instantaneous default increase in its labour
productivity due to the fact that output should remain constant while wage
costs have dropped. Further to this, there should be a productivity im-
provement due to the inputs being available at a higher quality or a lower
cost than was the case within the boundaries of the rm. The most basic
Smithian idea of specialization and division of labour can be drawn upon
to explain the higher quality input coming from an outside provider. Prop-
erty Rights, Transaction Cost, and Principal-Agent Theories can also help
explain why work done outside the rm will be to a higher quality. This will
be mentioned in more detail in Section 2, where I will also discuss reasons
explaining the compounded eect that international outsourcing can have
on rm-level productivity. Empirically I test for the eects of domestic and
international outsourcing by allowing them to aect the technology shifter
in a Cobb-Douglas Production Function framework.
Now that the factors driving outsourcing's potential eect on productivity
have been explained, I move to a summary of the small amount of empirical
work done so far on the issue at the rm level. Early work on outsourcing by
Gorzig and Stephan (2002) and Girma and Gorg (2004) did not dierentiate
bewteen domestic and international outsourcing. The former paper, using
German data, generally nds positive and signicant eects of outsourcing
on returns per employee, but negative eects of service outsourcing on rm
protability, which it uses as an alternative measure of performance in some
specications. The latter paper, using UK data, denes outsourcing as the
\cost of industrial services received". Their outsourcing intensity variable
is then the ratio of outsourcing to the total wage bill. It nds positive and
signicant eects of outsourcing on productivity, and nds that this eect
5is more pronounced for foreign-owned rms. The results only hold in the
chemical and engineering sectors however.
Gorg and Hanley (2005), using Irish electronics sector rm-level data from
Forfas, nd statistically signicant positive eects of international outsourc-
ing on productivity. International outsourcing in this case is measured as the
ratio of imported inputs to total inputs. When the data is broken down, it
appears that only material outsourcing leads to productivity improvements,
with no eect from services outsourcing. On further inspection, the authors
nd that the eect only holds for plants with low export intensities. Employ-
ing a similar estimation framework to data on rms in all Irish manufacturing
industries, Gorg et al (2004) conjecture that the international orientation of
rms is vital in determining the benet they can reap from outsourcing. They
nd evidence that foreign-owned rms' productivity increases with both ma-
terials and services outsourcing. For Irish-owned rms they nd a positive
signicant eect for materials, but a negative eect for services. Similar re-
sults are borne out when the data is broken down by export status. Exporters
have a positive sign for both types of outsourcing, while purely domestic rms
have signicant negative eects on their productivity due to outsourcing.
This paper contributes to the literature by including both domestic and inter-
national outsourcing intensity in the regression equation. Doing this allows
us to be certain that the eect picked up by the coecient on international
outsourcing is attributable specically to the international element and not
simply to the fact that the provider is outside the boundaries of the rm. The
data used here is a census rather than a survey, meaning that the sample is
fully representative of the population of Irish manufacturing rms. It is also
the rst to my knowledge to break rms down by both international orien-
tation and industry characteristics to analyse outsourcing at a more deeply
disaggregated level than before. The rest of the paper is organised as fol-
lows: Section 2 introduces a theoretical framework in which outsourcing and
international outsurcing can aect rm-level productivity. Section 3 explains
the data source, the CSO Census of Industrial Production. Section 4 reports
regression results, while Section 5 concludes.
2 Theoretical Framework
The productivity-enhancing eect of outsourcing can be explained theoreti-
cally through models of rms' decisions on in-house production versus out-
sourcing, such as principal-agent frameworks and transaction cost theory.
The former suggests that outsourcing will increase productivity as it limits
opportunism and self-serving behaviour on behalf of employees. In this con-
6text, output can be better controlled and ineciencies minimized through a
contract than within the boundaries of the rm, so outsourcing is chosen for
its productivity enhancing eects. The latter theory suggests that outsourc-
ing is subject to certain costs such as search costs, contract incompleteness
and relationship-specic investment. If these costs are outweighed by the
savings from specialization which outsourcing oers, then a rm will decide
to outsource. Grossman and Helpman (2003) and others point out that this
characteristic of outsourcing is more easily exploitable the \thicker" the out-
sourcing market. The logic is that the more input suppliers there are in a
given country, the higher the likelihood of nding a supplier that matches
the needs of the nal good producing rm. This idea brings us back to the
most basic of explanations for the incentive to outsource: simple Smithian
specialisation. When a rm outsources a low-value activity such as its call
centre or a basic input, it can then reallocate resources into other activities
at which it is better, often referred to in the management literature as its
\core competencies". Outsourcing can also help rms in smoothing out sea-
sonal 
uctuations in economic activity, which means that excess spending on
unnecessary labour is avoided.
Above are mentioned several reasons for which the outsourcing of a service
or input should lead to labour producitvity increases. Oshore outsourcing
may confer further productivity gains above and beyond those for outsourcing
from within the home country. Amiti and Wei (2006) mention the majority
of these productivity-driving factors. The increase in the variety of inputs ac-
quired from international outsourcing means that, in the \market thickness"
framework mentioned above, the probability of nding an input provider
with the \perfect t" increases. With an increased variety of inputs will
often come an increased quality of input. Thus the rm's technology fron-
tier also shifts through workers becoming more ecient through exposure to
more sophisticated technologies embedded in these inputs. The procurement
of service inputs from abroad can also lead to \learning by doing" eects
for employees exposed to the new methods. All of these eects suggest that
international outsourcing may have a supplementary eect beyond the gen-
eral productivity-enhancing eects of sourcing an input from outside the rm
mentioned in the previous paragraph. In the empirical section of this paper,
I will test whether there is a productivity improvement associated with in-
ternational and/or domestic outsourcing.
Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2006), at the aggregate level, also give
an explanation for the productivity-enhancing eects of oshoring. They
model tasks as tradeable, claiming that before their paper the lowest level
of aggregation was at the level of goods. They show that, much as was the
7case previously with trade in goods, once certain tasks are oshored (those in
which the home country has a comparative disadvantage), workers will have
to move into tasks in which the home country has a comparative advantage.
This means, in developed countries, that the workforce will be reallocated
into higher-value tasks, and hence its average productivity will increase.
I posit that there are two potential causal channels from international
outsourcing to productivity: rstly, a \technology eect", identical to that
spelled out in Amiti and Wei (2006) and mentioned above. The second chan-
nel is one I term the \cost saving" channel. This channel is associated with
the modern interpretation of international outsourcing as a cost-saving prac-
tice engaged in with rms in India, China and other developing countries.
The extremely low cost of inputs along this channel means that rms make
huge savings and are then able to either reallocate or make redundant work-
ers. The latter option has led to much of the recent negative media coverage
and political connotations surrounding international outsourcing. This sec-
ond potential channel does not seem to t the Irish data. A look at Table A1
will show that the vast majority of Irish rms' inputs have come from other
developed nations in the EU, along with the US and UK. This allows me to
claim with condence that when I test for the productivity-enhancing eects
of international outsourcing, I am indeed testing for eects such as exposure
to technology and know-how, and variety and quality of inputs.
Empirically I explain the potential productivity benets of outsourcing,
as in most of the literature on the topic, within the Cobb-Douglas Production
Function framework. In the rst instance, I posit that only international out-
sourcing can have an eect on the technology shifter. In the second instance,
the intensity of both domestic and international outsourcing are allowed to
have an eect.
2.1 International outsourcing as a determining factor
The rst regression equation is similar to that of Gorg et al (2004) and Gorg
and Hanley (2005). A standard Cobb-Douglas rm-level Production Funtion
for rm i with capital, labour and materials included as inputs, looks as fol-
lows:
Yit = Ait[F(Kit;Lit;Mit)] (1)
Where Yit is output, Ait is the technology shifter, Kit is rm capital stock,
8Lit is labour, measured as number of employees per rm and Mit is material
inputs. If we take logs and subtract li = ln(Li) from both sides, thus trans-
forming both sides to levels per employee, we get the following expression for
the log of labour productivity:
yit   lit = ait + 1(kit   lit) + 2(mit   lit) (2)
It is common to incorporate international outsourcing's eect on produc-
tivity into this framework through the technology factor in the production
function, as outlined by Olsen (2006). This gives,
ait = 0 + 1FOSit + 2Zit (3)
Where FOS is a measure of the international or foreign outsourcing in-
tensity of rm i and Z is a vector of rm characteristics that could include
export status, ownership status, location, age, etc.
This means we are allowing international outsourcing, along with some
other rm characteristics, to shift the intercept of the production function.
This process is driven by the \technology eect" mentioned in Section 2.
Adding in a dynamic element, this gives the following base regression:
yit lit = 0+1FOSit+2Zit+1(kit lit)+2(mit lit)+3(yi;t 1 li;t 1)+!i+it+it
(4)
Where ! refers to rm xed eects,  refers to the serially correlated un-
observable and  refers to the random error term. The assumptions on the
error term are discussed in more detail in Section 4.
2.2 Outsourcing as a determining factor
Assuming that all the theoretical explanations for outsourcing aecting pro-
ductivity mentioned in Sectioned 2 are plausible, expression (3) can be rewrit-
ten as
ait = 0 + 1FOSit + 2DOSit + 3SOSit + 4Xit (5)
Where FOS is foreign outsourcing of materials, DOS is domestic outsourc-
ing of materials and SOS is outsourcing of services, which can not be broken
down into domestic of foreign in the data for this paper. The technology
9shifter is now assumed to be in
uenced by outsourcing of inputs from out-
side the rm in general, and not only by the international outsourcing of
inputs. The results of this regression will add robustness to the coecients
on international outsourcing intensity, as we can now be sure that the eect
is purely due to the fact that the inputs are sourced abroad. Once a dynamic
specication is allowed, we end up with the following:
yit   lit = 0 + 1FOSit + 2DOSit + 3SOSit + 4Xit + 1(kit   lit)
+2(mit   lit) + 3(yi;t 1   li;t 1) + Zi + !i + it + it (6)
We now have two estimable equations (4) and (6), which will be the
subject of regression analysis in Section 4.
3 Data
The dataset used is the Census of Industrial Production (CIP), which is
collected each year by the Central Statistics Oce (CSO) of Ireland. It is
compulsory, giving plant and enterprise-level information on all manufactur-
ing rms with 3 or more persons engaged in Ireland from 1991-2005. The
availability of plant-level data allows the exploitation of productivity het-
erogeneity within industries, something which is not possible with aggregate
industry-level studies. Industry breakdown at the 2, 3 and 4 digit level is
given in accordance with NACE Rev 1 from 1991-2001 and NACE Rev 1.1
from 2002-2005. The panel is unbalanced, with sample size for each year
outlined in Table A2. Out of 9,837 rm IDs that appear in the sample, 1564
appear in every year. All monetary variables have been de
ated using the
CSO's Consumer Price Index Annual % changes table, with 1991 used as
the base year.
In Table 2 the international orientation of rms in the data is outlined.
We see that, in line with expectations given the fact that Ireland is well
known as a hub for export-platform FDI, 90% of foreign-owned rms export.
For Irish-owned rms, we see that roughly half export some of their output.
A similar amount of foreign-owned rms import some of their material im-





Table 1: International orientation of rms in Ireland
10The dependent variable is the log of labour productivity, where labour
productivity is calculated as gross output divided by total number of em-
ployees. We see from Table 2 that the natural log of labour productivity is
smallest for indigenous domestic market-serving rms (Dom in the table),
larger for indigenous exporters and larger still for foreign-owned rms. This
is what we would expect if we believe the strand of literature beginning with
Melitz (2003), which states that a rm must overcome xed, and then sunk,
entry costs to foreign markets. The ranking found here matches that of
Helpman, Melitz, Yeaple (2004)(HMY from here on), which builds on Melitz
(2003) to allow rms to engage in FDI as an alternate method of penetrating
overseas markets. We also see from the data that Irish rms are smaller than
exporters, who are much smaller than foreign-owned rms. This same rank-
ing holds true for capital stock, for which I have had to use a proxy due to
data restrictions, and for both materials and services used. The proxy used
for capital is the amount of fuel used, in line with Ruane and Ugur (2002),
who use this dataset to analyse the productivity spillover eects of foreign
presence in Ireland on Irish rms.
Dom Ex For
logprod 10.94 11.0698 11.6855
rm size 23 43 161
l 2.508 2.857 4.216
k 6.872 6.918 7.267
m 9.951 10.211 10.68
s 5.225 5.549 5.594
Outsourcing Intensities
Dom Mat OS 3.181 3.1 1.436
For Mat OS 0.7815 1.5962 3.1489
Serv OS 0.177 0.143 0.1668
Outsourcing, euro values ('000)
Dom Mat OS 990 2,532 4,798
For Mat OS 290 982 16,800
Serv OS 82 108 1,027
Table 2: Summary Firm Characteristics
The CIP data allow for a much more direct and accurate measure of out-
sourcing than that used in older industry-level studies such as Feenstra and
Hanson (1999)2. Table 2 outlines outsourcing, both in its intensity and in its
2These older measures involve calculating the share of imported intermediate inputs
over total imports at the industry level.
11raw gure in thousands of euro, by the HMY breakdown. The outsourcing
intensity for each type of input is computed as the ratio of the purchases of
that input from outside the rm to the rm's total wage bill. This approach
seems sensible if we think that outsourcing is a way of replacing labour costs
within a rm. A measure which relates the amount of inputs sourced from
outside the rm to the amount paid in wages to those that carry out tasks
within the rm can be considered a plausible measure of vertical disintegra-
tion. The materials outsourcing variable is total materials purchased3. The
foreign/domestic outsourcing distinction is simply given by the total gure
multiplied by the percentage reported as imported and as sourced within
the Republic of Ireland respectively. The services outsourcing variable 4, as
mentioned above, is unfortunately not separable into domestic and foreign
components.
We see from Table 2 that, in terms of the raw gures, foreign rms source
more of each input from outside the rm than do exporters, who in turn
source more than Irish rms. This holds for domestic materials, foreign ma-
terials, and services. This is to be expected given that this ranking also holds
for size, capital stock, materials used, and services used. In terms of the in-
tensity with which rms outsource, however, a dierent picture emerges. We
now see that Irish rms source domestically more intensively than exporters,
who in turn source domestically more intensively than foreign-owned rms.
The opposite ranking applies for Foreign Materials Outsourcing. Even when
we account for rm scale by using the total wage bill as the denominator,
foreign rms still source materials from abroad more than twice as intensively
as exporters, who in turn source from abroad twice as intensively as domes-
tic rms. Given that services are not broken down into a domestic-foreign
dichotomy, there are no a priori expectations regarding which type of rm
will outsource more intensively. As it turns out, it is Irish domestic rms
that have the highest services outsourcing intensity. This indicates that, if
the trend in materials is followed, most services outsourcing is of a domestic
rather than international nature.
3.1 Outsourcing in a global context
There has been a huge growth in the level of outsourcing over the past two
decades. Yeats (1998) reports that for 1995 trade in parts and components in
3This includes \Raw Materials, Materials for repairs, Materials purchased for the pro-
duction of capital goods by your enterprise for your own use, Packaging, Oce supplies"'
4dened as \work done on commission or contract, amounts paid for repairs and main-
tenance, etc"
12the Machinery and Transportation (SITC 7) sector totalled roughly $550bn.
This sector accounted for about half of global manufacturing trade in that
year. Kimura et al (2007) show global exports of machinery parts and com-
ponents to have reached $1.3trillion by 2003, which was 45% of all machinery
exports and 20% of all global commodity exports. Amiti and Wei (2004) show
that the top ten importers of Business and ICT services (the sectors most
aected by international services outsourcing) in 2002 accounted for a mere
$200bn5, while Rohde (2004) estimates global business service outsourcing
to be $160bn for 2005. From these gures it is clear that the international
sourcing of parts and components has expanded massively. Another impor-
tant fact emerges from these gures. This is the dominance of parts and
components, or \materials" outsourcing over that of services. If one were to
believe the media coverage of the last decade, one would think of outsourcing
as simply the movement of IT and service jobs to countries such as India,
rather than as this much more all-encompassing international fragmentation
of all types and stages of production. To further emphasise this point, Amiti
and Wei (2004) calculate average industry-level international outsourcing in-
tensity ratios, weighted by output, for the UK and US. They nd gures of
5.5 and 0.8 percent respectively for services outsourcing against 27 and 12
percent respectively for material outsourcing. They do however show that the
services gures are trending upwards while the materials gures decreased
in the late nineties and are roughly stagnant since. It is still clear that in
terms of magnitude, materials outsourcing is much more important. This is
also borne out in the data used in this paper, as will be seen in the following
subsection.
3.2 Outsourcing in Ireland
Ireland, as one of the world's most globalised countries, seems an interesting
country in which to study the eects of outsourcing on rms' performance.
Table 3 gives an indication of the evolution of outsourcing in Irish manu-
facturing across the time period. Figures quoted are the mean per rm, in
thousands of euro. We see a clear trend emerge - rms in Ireland started
in the early 90's relying to a greater degree on Irish material inputs. As
the 90's progressed foreign outsourcing became more and more prevalent,
with domestic sourcing dwindling, to the point where by 2004 almost twice
as much material inputs were being sourced abroad. Both this, and the
5Unfortunately the authors do not give a gure for total global service imports. From
eyeballing the data, however, it does not appear that the countries outside the top ten
account for much more than another $100bn, leaving global Business and ICT Service
imports lying between $200bn-$300bn
13steady rise in services outsourcing, indicate that Ireland has followed the
global trend mentioned in 3.1 above. The fact that material sourcing still
far outweighs services sourcing6, stressed in Section 3.1 above, is also borne
out in Table 3. This statement admittedly comes with a caveat, as only the
manufacturing sector is analysed here, resulting in an obvious bias towards
material outsourcing over that of services.
Outsourcing 1992 1996 2000 2004
Foreign Mat 1,612 2,590 3,478 3,008
Domestic Mat 2,229 2,467 2,144 1,670
Service 101 147 239 303
Table 3: Evolution of outsourcing (`000 EUR)
Table 4 moves on to another pertinent empirical question: who out-
sources? To answer this question, I break the data down by a number of
dierent criteria to see what type of rms source materials from where. Find-
ings are similar to those in Girma and Gorg (2004). Figures report the mean
amount, in thousands of euro, of each outsourcing activity. Outsourcing in-
tensity is reported in parentheses. The rst breakdown is between high-wage
rms (those that pay an average adjusted wage below EUR 18,000), versus
low-wage. This threshold roughly splits the data in half. We see that high-
wage rms source domestically with three times the magnitude of low-wage
rms, and source from abroad with roughly 8 times the magnitude. In terms
of relative sourcing, we see that low-wage rms rely more heavily on Irish
inputs (1.37:1) than high-wage rms (0.65:1). The gures in parentheses are
the mean outsourcing intensities for each group. Both high and low-wage
rms are found on average to have a higher domestic than foreign outsourc-
ing intensity.
\Large rms" are dened to be those that employ more than 20 employees.
This threshold again splits the data roughly in half. Under this dichotomy we
see striking dierences. Large rms source domestically with sixteen times
the magnitude of small rms, and source from abroad with fourty-two times
the magnitude. Again when we look at the outsourcing intensities, we see
that both types of rms on average source more intensively from Ireland than
from abroad, and that large rms source from abroad more intensively than
small rms. These ndings are in line with Wakasugi et al (2008), who show
6the data only allows the domestic-international distinction to be made for materials
outsourcing.
14that for Japanese rms, the extent of oshore outsourcing increases with
rm size. 10% of rms employing 99 or less employees engaged in oshore
outsourcing, with that gure rising to 20%, 50% and 65% for rms under
300 employees, less than 1,000 and over 1,000 respectively.
The most relevant dichotomy in Table 4 is that between high and low-
productivity rms. Splitting the sample in half, with the threshold level
being a natural log of labour productivity of 11, we see that high-productivity
rms source more intensively than low-productivity rms in both categories.
In terms of magnitudes, high-productivity rms source 20 times as much
foreign material and 13 times as much domestic material. This correlation
between productivity and outsourcing leads me to the crucial conundrum
of this paper - the potential endogeneity of outsourcing and productivity.
This endogeneity problem is particularly severe in the case of international
outsourcing. If we believe that the logic of Melitz (2003)and HMY (2004)
applies on the input side as well as the nal good sales side, we then have
the conjecture that only the most productive rms will overcome the entry
costs of sourcing inputs from abroad, and hence causality in both directions.
This endogeneity issue is dealt with in Section 4.
Domestic OS Foreign OS
High wage 3,529 (2.264) 5,347 (1.633)
Low wage 1,006 (3.470) 729 (1.293)
Large rms 4,815 (2.538) 6,691 (1.766)
Small rms 288 (3.180) 157(1.240)
High Productivity 4,013 (3.753) 5,415 (2.175)
Low Productivity 292 (2.025) 274 (0.726)
Breakdown by HMY(04)
Domestic Firms 990 (3.181) 289 (0.785)
Exporters 2,531 (3.100) 981 (1.596)
Foreign Firms 4,797 (1.436) 16,800 (3.149)
Breakdown by Peneder
Mainstream Manuf 771 (1.612) 1,214 (1.394)
Labour-intensive 494 (1.885) 593(1.091)
Capital-intensive 1,970 (2.092) 8,745(3.789)
Marketing-driven 4,581 (5.646) 1,105(1.163)
Technology-intensive 3,439 (1.319) 19,400 (3.223)
Table 4: Who outsources materials?
Table 4 also reports outsourcing gures for the Helpman, Melitz, Yeaple
15breakdown, which have already been discussed in Section 3. Foreign rms
source more than exporters, who source more than domestic rms, both for
domestic and foreign materials. Foreign rms are the only grouping in Table
4 that source from abroad more intensively than they source from Ireland,
suggesting that linkages to and knowledge of international markets are ex-
tremely important for international outsourcing.
The last breakdown is by the Peneder (2002) classication of NACE 4-digit
industries. Peneder claims his classication to be novel in that it tracks both
comparative cost advantages stemming from exogenous location dependent
factors such as relative endowments of capital and labour, as well as rm-
specic advantages stemming from intangible investment in R&D and adver-
tising. He uses statistical cluster analysis to group all industries into one of
the ve groups in Table 4. The labels \labour-intensive", \capital-intensive",
\marketing-driven", and \technology-driven" are self-explanatory. \Main-
stream manufacturing" comprises industries that did not t neatly into one
of the other four groupings, and it therefore has less analytical use. We see
that international outsourcing is most common in the capital and technology-
intensive sectors, which we would expect at this point. Marketing-driven
industries, which include food and beverages, have the highest levels of do-
mestic sourcing. For an overview of how the Peneder and Helpman, Melitz,
Yeaple groupings interact, see Table A3. From this we see that foreign rms
have by far the greatest share technology-intensive intensive (31%, versus 7%
and 3% for exporters and domestic rms respectively). The same holds for
capital-intensive rms (8% versus 3% for both exporters and domestic), but
at a smaller magnitude. Irish rms have the highest share of labour-intensive
rms. These are results that we would expect to hold given what we know
about productivity rankings from Table 2. An interesting nding is that the
Peneder breakdown by exporters and domestic rms is almost identical. This
may indicate that Irish exporters are not at the level of \sophistication" that
we would expect given international evidence. This idea also gains weight
when we look back at Table 2 and see that exporters are far closer to domestic
rms than to foreign rms in terms of productivity, size and capital intensity.
4 Empirics
4.1 Estimation Procedure
My empirical analysis comprises the testing of equations (4) and (6). In
dealing with production functions, there are a number of econometric issues
16which can compromise the standard Panel Data approach. Firstly, it is rea-
sonable to believe that a production function can be characterised as having
a dynamic element. This means that there will be serial correlation in the
dependent variable, so that lagged labour productivity is an important ex-
planatory variable. Secondly, the endogeneity of factor inputs must be dealt
with. It may be that more productive rms can choose to purchase more
capital or materials or services, or hire more labour, rather than it simply
being the case that causality only runs from inputs to productivity. Further
to these problems common to all production functions, in this study there
is also the possibility that international outsourcing decisions may be en-
dogenous, i.e. more productive rms may be more likely to outsource. The
reasoning behind this endogeneity can be thought of in the Melitz (2003)
framework, applying his ideas on exporting to the importing of inputs. It
may be the case that more productive rms are the only ones capable of
entering into international markets for inputs, due to the higher xed costs
involved in entering these markets. If this were the case, any causal eect
from international outsourcing to productivity would be endogenous. This
thought line may also even apply to domestic outsourcing, if we think that
there are search costs involved in nding an outsourcing partner, as in the
theoretical work of Grossman and Helpman (2004) and others.
Given these possible channels of endogeneity, the \System" GMM estima-
tor developed by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998)
seems a sensible way to estimate equations (4) and (6). To quote Roodman
(2006):
(These estimators were both designed for) situations with \large
N, small T"' panels ...; independent variables that are not strictly
exogenous, meaning correlated with past and possibly current re-
alizations of the error; xed eects; heteroskedasticity and auto-
correlation within individuals
Take the composite error term, it to be composed of a time-invariant
xed eect !i, a rm-specic unobservable it and a random error term it.
The fact that  can include both a xed eect and a serially correlated error
component is deemed by Ackerberg et al (2006) to be the greatest advantage
that this estimator has over structural models in the tradition of Olley-Pakes
(1996). It also makes less strict assumptions on the random error component
it. The following assumptions are made on the elements comprising it. It
allows correlation between the !i and the inputs. It assumes that the it is
i.i.d and uncorrelated with the inputs. It further assumes, as do structural
17models such as Olley-Pakes (1996), that while the it are correlated with in-
puts at time t, the innovations in it occur between t 1 and t. This means
they are uncorrelated with inputs at t   1 and earlier.
Arellano-Bond (1991) dierences equations which are then instrumented by
lagged levels. This straight away purges the !i. However these untrans-
formed lags are considered to be poor instruments, particularly when the
dependent variable is close to a random walk. To improve on this, the \Sys-
tem GMM" estimator keeps these equations but adds another stack for every
observation, by taking the equations in levels and instrumenting them with
lags of the dierences. These lagged diferences must be orthoganal to the
xed eects, !i. Standard treatment of an endogenous regressor is to start in-
strumenting with the second lag. This is because the rst lagged level, xi;t 1
will be endogenous and correlated with the i;t 1 in the it  i;t 1. Validity
of instruments also depends on the errors not being serially correlated. If
there is serial correlation of order 1 in the errors, xi;t 2 is endogenous to the
i;t 1 term in the error term in dierences, it   i;t 1, so the second lag
is not a valid instrument. To overcome this, we simply start instrumenting
with a third lag. At times it may be necessary to start with even deeper lags.
Arellano-Bond test statistics for second-order autocorrelation in dierences,
and Hansen test statistics for instrument validity are reported for all regres-
sions. The depth and range of lags used as instruments are reported under
the heading \laglimits".
4.2 Regression Results
In initial regressions, I estimate Equation (4) using the \System GMM" es-
timator. A positive signicant coecient on the international outsourcing
variable indicates that it does indeed have an eect on the rm's technology
shifter, and hence on rm productivity. The results of the regressions on the
full sample of rms are reported in column (1) of Table 5 below. A result that
fails the Arellano-Bond test, implying autocorrelation cannot be rejected at
the 5% level, is reported in bold. If avoidable, a second lag of the dependent
variable is not included as a regressor. In any instance that it is included, I
have done so where autocorrelation was unavoidable without including the
second lag. Hansen reports the coecient from a test for instrument validity,
with a value above .05 indicating instrument validity. Laglimits reports the
range of the instrument matirx, where (3 5) means that the 3rd, 4th and
5th lags were used as instruments. Looking at the results, we nd the ex-
pected positive signicant coecients on the lagged dependent variable and
on the Cobb-Douglas inputs. Export status does not have a signicant eect
18however. This is surprising, but may be expected given the facts mentioned
at the end of 3.2 regarding Irish indigenous exporters. Foreign ownership
does have a positive signicant coecient. The parameter of interest, inter-
national material outsourcing intensity has a positive, small coecient, but
is statistically insignicant for the full sample.
Given the huge level of heterogeneity across rms, the above results do
not tell us a whole lot. Breaking the data down into the three HMY sub-
groups, to allow international outsourcing's eect on productivity to dier by
international orientation. Equation (4) is then run on these three subsamples
with the results shown in columns (2), (3) and (4). From this breakdown we
can see that the eect of international outsourcing on rm productivity does
depend on the international orientation of the rm. All other variables have
the same sign and signicance as the full sample, apart from capital stock
in the foreign subsample, indicating the proxy may not be perfect. Foreign-
owned rms get the largest increase from international outsourcing, and the
only statically signicant eect. A one-unit increase in international out-
sourcing intensity leads to a 1% increase in labour productivity. If we believe
that the exposure to international markets, a knowledge of global produc-
tion processes, an embeddedness in international production networks and
easier access to more advanced technologies are associated with international
orientation, then these results sit well. The lack of an eect for exporters,
on the other hand, is something that is less easily explained. Perhaps it is
the case that, as alluded to earlier, indigenous Irish exporters are simply not
exceptional performers.
19Dependent variable: log of labour productivity
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Subsample Full Indigenous Indigenous Foreign
Sample Domestic Exporter Owned
L1.Logprod .5357*** .3089*** .3538*** .6757***
L2.logprod :118820 .1211** .2215** n/a
k .0579** .1184** :102220 .0238
m .1409*** .2276** .2670*** .1288***
export -.0428 n/a n/a .4019
ctry :386920 n/a n/a n/a
ForMatOS .0018 .0053 -.0002 .0106**
laglimits (3 5) (3 5) (3 5) (3 5)
A-B stat .572 .028 .143 .013
Hansen .722 .781 .461 .653
Obs 47,029 20,658 19,328 7,043
*** - statistical signicance at 1%
**- statistical signicance at the 5%
* - statistical signicance at the 10%
x20 - statistical signicance at the 20%
Table 5: Estimation of Equation (1)
Equation (6) tests whether the intensity of domestic material and service,
as well as international material, outsourcing has an eect on the technology
shifter. Column (5) reports results for the full sample, while Columns (6) to
(8) report the results for the HMY groups. The signicance of international
material outsourcing remains for foreign rms when these two extra variables
are included. A point of note is the ranking of the international outsourcing
coecients: foreign rms have the largest eect, which one would expect a
priori, but domestic rms (with a coecient of eectively zero) have a larger
coecient than Irish exporters. Given the lack of a signicant eect from
domestic outsourcing to productivity, it seems that unless inputs are sourced
from beyond the borders of the rm's home nation, their outsourcing does
not increase productivity.
On the subject of services outsourcing, we see that only foreign rms gain.
One cannot say a whole lot about this nding given that we cannot break
down the data into Irish and foreign services. One can however imagine that
perhaps only foreign rms have the know-how or resources to ensure that a
service outsourcing contract is the right \t", as in Grossman and Helpman
(2005).
20Dependent variable: log of labour productivity
(5) (6) (7) (8)
Subsample Full Dom Exp For
L1.Logprod .5146*** .4420*** .338*** .4329***
L2.logprod .0692 .0190 .1922** .1859**
k .0804** .1850*** .0907* .0945*
m .1762*** .2362*** .3493*** .1788***
export -.1537 n/a n/a .448
ctry .5297*** n/a n/a n/a
ForMatOS .0056** -.0003 -.0011 .0076*
DomMatOS -.0015** .002 -.0011 .0071
ServOS :018620 .023 .0575 .0420**
laglimits (3 5) (3 3) (3 5) (3 5)
A-B stat .934 .785 .045 .227
Hansen .476 .079 .276 .475
Obs 47,029 20,658 19,328 7,043
Table 6: Estimation of Equation (2)
4.3 Further disaggregation
Section 4.2 has established the instances in which the interaction between
international orientation of the rm and the origin and type of input sourced
matter for the productivity eects of outsourcing. To delve a little further
beneath the surface of these gures, each HMY category is broken down by
the ve Peneder (2002) industry types, to see if there is heterogeneity within
groups with heterogeneous international orientation. To this end, Equation
(6) is run on each of the fteen subgroups.
For the sake of brevity, I simply report the coecients for the foreign ma-
terial, domestic material and service outsourcing intensities7. Tables 5 and
6 showed that domestic rms were more likely to experience a productiv-
ity gain from international outsourcing than indigenous exporters, although
neither had a signicant eect. In Table 7 we see that this eect is driven
7The coecients on the lagged dependent variable, capital and materials all come in
positive and signicant for each specication, with three exceptions
21completely by rms in capital-intensive. This again shows the importance
of recognising rm heterogeneity. Among exporters, who were shown in the
previous subsection to benet the least from international outsourcing, we
similarly see that in the labour, capital and technology-intensive industries,
exporters have a positive coecient for international outsourcing. While
Irish exporters in general have been shown not to be exceptional performers
throughout this paper, it seems that within the exporting sector there are
subsectors in which a \learning by outsourcing" eect does exist. Among
foreign rms we see that in all Peneder sectors there is a positive signicant
coecient on international outsourcing, albeit at only the 20% level in cap-
ital intensive industries. We also see that in three of the sectors there is a
positive eect from domestic sourcing to foreign rm productivity, indicat-
ing that the result in Table 6 may be misleading. The results here indicate
that the majority of foreign rms do in fact experience productivity gains
from domestic sourcing in Ireland, which is tantamount to implying that
there exist productivity-enhancing vertical linkages between multinationals
and indigenous suppliers in marketing-driven, technology-driven and main-
stream manufacturing industries.
Dependent variable: log of labour productivity
Subgroup
HMY Peneder For Mat Dom Mat Ser A-B Hansen Obs
Dom Manuf .0027 .0105 .0213 .315 .659 4,654
Dom Labour .0112 -.0055 .384*** .174 .893 7,135
Dom Capital .0072** -.0088** .1647** .725 .08 481
Dom Marketing .0067 .0055*** -.1064*** .327 .411 6,454
Dom Technology .0345 .0027 .1278** .837 .249 658
Exp Manuf. -.0131 -.0183 -.0237 .057 .815 5,436
Exp Labour .037** -.0033 .1729** .133 .347 5,363
Exp Capital .0089** .0077 .165** .115 .092 645
Exp Marketing 0 -.002 .0127 .18 .245 6,247
Exp Technology :01520  :015720 :31820 .031 .288 1,402
For Manuf. .0243*** .0243*** .0884 .032 0 2,131
For Labour .007* -.042** .0629*** .858 1 725
For Capital :006920 .0187 -.0189 .333 1 584
For Marketing .0484* :012420 .0163** .851 .742 1,364
For Technology .0094*** :013320 :109420 .043 .565 2,151
Table 7: Equation 2 for each HMY-Peneder subgroup
225 Conclusions
The outsourcing of inputs to the production process can lead to productivity
gains at the rm level. These gains can arise through cost savings, higher
quality products from specialised providers, reallocation of workers and re-
sources to \core competence" activities, and in the case of international out-
sourcing, higher quality or variety of inputs, exposure to new technologies and
know-how and learning-by-doing eects for workers. After having theoreti-
cally explained how outsourcing can aect productivity in a Cobb-Douglas
production function framework, I go on to test the hypothesis using a \Sys-
tem GMM" estimator on data for Irish manufacturing rms. This estimator
allows for a lagged dependent variable and endogenous regressors. In initial
estimations on the full sample a positive signicant eect of international
outsurcing of material inputs on rm productivity is found. Upon further
inspection I nd that this eect is strongest for foreign rms, indicating that
a knowledge of, and embeddedness in, international production networks is
important. Notable at this level of disaggregation is the lack of an eect
for indigenous exporters. Upon further disaggregation of the data along the
lines suggested by Peneder (2002), I nd that the positive coecient on in-
ternational outsourcing for domestic rms is specic to rms operating in
capital-intensive industries (which are a small proportion of total domestic
rms), exporters in three subgroups have positive coecients, while foreign
rms in all subgroups have a positive coecient. This suggests that Irish
rms are in the majority not increasing their productivity as a result of
international sourcing of inputs, but that being an exporter can be comple-
mentary to gains from outsourcing in certain industries. The positive sign
on domestic outsourcing intensity for three of the ve subgroups of foreign
rms is heartening from an Irish policymaker's point of view. The key mes-
sage to take from the paper is that international outsourcing of materials is
shown to have a more consistent and larger impact on rm level productivity
than domestic outsourcing, and that it is vital that heterogeneity in interna-
tional orientation and industry type are taken into account before drawing
any conclusions.
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appendix
Source 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
UK 18.24 18.58 13.96 12.6 14.37
EU 11.28 10.27 7.96 9.92 10.94
US 3.12 3.43 3.82 3.78 3.48
RofW 3.35 3.5 3.99 3.69 3.85
Imports/Materials 37% 36% 31% 32% 36%
Table A1: Irish Input Imports by Provenance. Figures report percentage of
total material input purchases accounted for by imports from that country or
region.















Table A2: Sample Size by Year, Census of Industrial Production, (CSO)
Table A3: HMY by Peneder
Dom Exp For
Mainstream Manuf 6,266 (24) 7,690 (27) 2,736 (30)
Labour-intensive 9,712 (36) 8,292 (29) 956 (10)
Capital-intensive 743 (3) 913 (3) 753 (8)
Marketing-driven 8,873 (33) 9,236 (32) 1,859 (20)
Technology-intensive 960 (3) 2,169 (7) 2,862(31)
Total 26,554 28,300 9,166
Number of rms, with percentage of total HMY category accounted for by
each Peneder category reported in parentheses
27